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I. PAIN AND SUFFERING
A. PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING
Nebraska lawyers often make the comment that juries in
our state do not give large verdicts for pain and suffering. This
is not always true, as can be readily proved by the extremely
large per-hour verdicts for pain and suffering given in two Ne-
braska cases in the 1930's.
In a 1936 Dodge County personal injury suit,' the jury awarded
$6000 on a separate cause of action for pain and suffering for a
man who died 36 hours after an automobile accident. On appeal
the judgment was reversed on other grounds, but the question
of possible excessiveness of the verdict was not discussed in the
Supreme Court opinion and there is no indication it was even
raised. The $6000 awarded for 36 hours of pain would average
out to $167 per hour, and if extended for a year would amount
to nearly 11/ million dollars!
The jury in a 1937 Douglas County personal injury suit,2
awarded $1850 for pain and suffering to a man who died 42 hours
after an automobile accident. On appeal the Supreme Court re-
duced the verdict to $1350 by remittitur, the court noting that
the man was not mentally clear at least two-thirds of the time
and was given some relief by morphine. The jury's original
award allowed over $44 per hour for pain and as reduced and
sustained by the Supreme Court on appeal amounted to $32 per
hour. These two cases should make it clear that pain and suf-
fering can be a very important element of damage.
Pain and suffering, of course, is not recoverable during a
period that an injured man is unconscious.3 Also, a recent case
* B.A. 1947, LL.B. 1950, University of Nebraska; Member Nebraska
Legislature 1957, 1959; State Chairman Nebraska Junior Bar 1956;
Author of Nebraska Automobile Negligence Law (1957); Presently a
member of the firm of Spear, Lamme, and Simmons, Fremont, Nebraska.
1 Suhr v. Lindell, 133 Neb. 856, 277 N.W. 381 (1938).
2 Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studio, 137 Neb. 289 at 306, 289 N.W. 341 at
349 (1939).
3 Vanderlippe v. Midwest Studio, supra; Dorsey v. Yost, 151 Neb. 66 at
71, 36 N.W.2d 574 at 577 (1949).
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held that pain suffered by the decedent before death is not re-
coverable in a wrongful death action, recovery being limited to
the pecuniary loss suffered by the beneficiaries. 4  This decision
in effect overrules the decision in the Vanderlippe Case5 where
the Supreme Court permitted recovery of damages for pain and
suffering of a decedent and also the Suhr Case0 where the trial
court permitted such recovery.
B. FUTRE PAIN AND SUFFERING
Damages, of course, are recoverable for future pain and suf-
fering.7 However, the pain and suffering must be shown with
reasonable certainty to justify an instruction thereon.8 An in-
struction on pain that a plaintiff will "probably suffer in the fu-
ture" is erroneous.9
Damages for future pain and suffering are based on the life
expectancy of the plaintiff in his injured condition and not on
his expectancy prior to the accident.10 That is, if the plaintiff
had a life expectancy of 30 years prior to his accident, but only
10 years after the accident, he would recover damages for future
pain for 10 years. This differs from damages for loss of earn-
ing capacity, which are based on life expectancy immediately be-
fore the injury." A recent decision holds that the value of
future pain should be reduced to its present worth, though two
judges dissented to this opinion.'2
C. MENTAL SUFFERING
The Nebraska court, in accordance with decisions in the other
states, has developed some rather complicated rules for determin-
ing whether mental suffering is recoverable.
4 Kroeger v. Safranek, 161 Neb. 182 at 192, 72 N.W.2d 831 at 840 (1955).
5 See note 2 supra.
6 See note 1 supra.
7 Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196 at 207, 55 N.W.2d 643 at 650 (1952).
8 Bresley v. O'Connor Inc., 163 Neb. 565 at 583, 80 N.W.2d 711 at 722
(1957).
9 Burkamp v. Roberts Sanitary Dairy, 177 Neb. 60 at 66, 219 N.W. 805 at
807 (1928).
10 Borcherding v. Eklund, supra.
11 Webb v. Omaha & S. I. R. Co., 101 Neb. 596, 164 N.W. 564 (1917).
12 Wolfe v. Mendel, 165 Neb. 16 at 27, 84 N.W.2d 109 at 115 (1957).
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1. Caused by Physical Contact or Injury to Plaintiff
Mental suffering is properly considered by the jury where
it is shown that the plaintiff suffered physical injuries, 13 since
physical suffering causes mental suffering.' 4 Mental suffering and
anxiety caused by physical injury is compensable whether or not
the injury was willfully caused.' 5 At least in one Nebraska
case,'0 the court indicated that only slight physical contact was
necessary in order to permit recovery of damages for mental
suffering. In this case, the defendant, a man, took plaintiff, a
woman, for a ride in his carriage, telling her that he was taking
her to the home of a friend whereas he actually intended to take
her to his own home for immoral purposes. When she discovered
his plans, she jumped from the carriage and later sued him for
her mental suffering from the rumors which circulated in the
neighborhood about her character after this incident. The court
held that there was trespass on the plaintiff's person sufficient
to justify damages for mental suffering, humiliation and disgrace.
2. Causes Later Physical Injury to Plaintiff
Where a plaintiff receives no physical injury but does have
mental suffering, which in turn causes physical injuries, he is
permitted to recover for those injuries. Thus in one older Ne-
braska case, 17 a street car which the plaintiff, a woman, was
starting to board, was struck in the rear by another street car,
frightening her and causing her to jump backwards. She became
sick and three days later suffered a miscarriage. It was held that
her injuries were compensable. In another case,' defendant's
dog acted as if it were going to attack plaintiff but did not ac-
tually bite her. Plaintiff fainted and later brought suit for ner-
vous prostration, for which she was allowed recovery.
Probably the most extreme example of the rule set forth in
the foregoing paragraph is the famous Rasmussen Case'9 where
13 Omaha Street R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240 at 245, 77 N.W. 675 at
677 (1898).
14 Southwell v. DeBoer, 163 Neb. 646 at 654, 80 N.W.2d 877 at 883 (1957).
15 American Water-Works Co. v. Dougherty, 37 Neb. 373, 55 N.W. 1051
(1893).
16 Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910).
17 Hanford v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643
(1925).
is Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751 at 755, 235 N.W. 335 at 337 (1931).
10 Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938).
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defendant negligently sold plaintiff's decedent a sack of poisoned
bran. The decedent fed the bran to his dairy cattle and other
livestock and a number died, destroying his dairy business. De-
cedent allegedly died of a heart condition resulting from shock
from the loss. The court, in allowing recovery for the plaintiff's
death, held that although recovery could not be allowed for
mental anguish without physical injury, the worry here did cause
a serious physical injury, a heart condition, so there could be
recovery for the death. Two judges dissented, holding that plain-
tiff could recover for damage to the livestock but not for de-
cedent's death since it could not have been reasonably foreseen
that sale of the poisoned bran would cause death.
3. Results from Non-malicious Act Against Plaintiff
If the wrong to the plaintiff was not malicious the plaintiff
cannot recover for mental suffering. In a recent case, plaintiff,
an actor, was hired by the defendant store to stage a fake rob-
bery. Plaintiff claimed that defendant had agreed previously to
obtain Omaha police permission for the fake robbery but had
not done so, and when plaintiff staged his performance, he and
his seven employees were arrested by the Omaha police. Plain-
tiff sued for breach of contract and sought to recover for mental
anguish. The court held that plaintiff could not recover, that
mental suffering is usually not recoverable in an action for breach
of contract unless the breach was a willful or independent tort.
Such damages are too remote to have been contemplated by the
parties.20
In another case,2 1 defendant telegraph company failed to de-
liver a telegram to plaintiff telling him that his father had died.
The plaintiff did not learn of the death until after the funeral
and sued the telegraph company for mental anguish. The court
denied recovery, holding that under federal law, which controls
the sending of telegrams, "pain and suffering and mental anguish
are too vague for legal redress where no injury is done to person,
property, health or reputation." It has also been held that where
a person's property is attached erroneously that there can be no
recovery for mental suffering as such is not compensable where
the personal property is destroyed without fraud, malice or ag-
gravated circumstances. 22
20 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
21 Burke v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 137 Neb. 878, 291 N.W. 555
(1940).
22 Henderson v. Weidman, 88 Neb. 813 at 815, 130 N.W. 579 at 580 (1910).
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4. Results from Malicious Act Against Plaintiff
Recovery has been allowed where the defendant's acts were
malicious even though there was only mental suffering and no
prior or subsequent physical injury. In a 1934 case,23 the defend-
ant extension university attempted to collect from the plaintiff
on an alleged debt by threatening to sue plaintiff and complain
to plaintiff's employer. The plaintiff sued the university for
mental pain and anguish. The court held that the plaintiff could
recover for mental pain even though he received no physical
injury since the defendant's action in sending plaintiff the letters
was malicious and designed to cause mental distress.
Compensation for mental suffering is recoverable in an action
for trespass to property where the trespass is inspired by fraud,
malice or like motives.2 4
5. Caused Plaintiff by Death of a Loved One
Nebraska decisions hold that no damages can be recovered
for sorrow from death of a loved one or from bereavement or
solace in a wrongful death action.25 Thus, where a woman suf-
fered a miscarriage, it was held that no damages were recover-
able for her sorrow caused by the child's death.26
6. Caused Plaintiff by Suffering of Loved One
In an early Nebraska case,27 the defendant newspaper pub-
lished articles accusing plaintiff of murder. Plaintiff sued for
libel and among other damages claimed mental suffering from
observing his wife's suffering from mental distress because of
the article. The court held that plaintiff could not recover for
his wife's misery. "Mental distress caused by sympathy for an-
other's suffering is not a recoverable element of damages."
23 LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424
(1934).
24 See Henderson v. Weidman, supra.
25 Johnson County v. Carmen, 71 Neb. 682 at 685, 99 N.W. 502 at 503
(1904); Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522 at 523, 194 N.W. 458 at 459
(1923).
26 Hanford v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 113 Neb. 423 at 440, 203 N.W.
643 at 650 (1925).
27 Dennison v. Daily News Publishing Co., 82 Neb. 675 at 677, 118 N.W.
568 at 569 (1908).
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II. PHYSICAL INJURIES
A. DISFIGUREMENT
Several Nebraska cases have included disfigurement among
the damages described by the plaintiff. Thus in discussing the
damages suffered by plaintiffs, cases have mentioned the fact
that the plaintiff, a married woman, suffered facial disfigure-
ment,28 that an unmarried woman had a scarred arm and a
crippled hand,29 that an unmarried woman suffered a scar on her
hand and a disabled hand which handicapped her chances of
marriage,30 and that a man had a disfiguring facial scar.31 Re-
covery has been permitted under the Workmen's Compensation
Act to an employee who suffered severe facial disfigurement
from burns and as a result was handicapped in obtaining em-
ployment. 32
B. NERVOUS CONDITION, PERSONALITY AND APPEARANCE CHANGE
Nebraska cases in discussing personal injuries have mentioned
the fact that a plaintiff's personality and appearance were
changed, 33 that as a result of the accident the plaintiff was ner-
vous and depressed,3 4 that the plaintiff's memory was impaired,35
and that the plaintiff suffered a nervous condition.36
C. INsANITY, PNEUMONIA AND HEART CONDITION
In a number of Nebraska cases, recovery has been allowed
for injuries beyond those ordinarily expected to arise from an
accident, where it is shown that they were a result of the acci-
28 Remmenga v. Selk, 152 Neb. 625 at 631, 42 N.W.2d 186 at 190 (1950);
Ziskovsky v. Miller, 120 Neb. 255 at 261, 231 N.W. 809 at 812 (1930);
Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938). (64 year old widow
lost part of an ear).
29 Hickey v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 140 Neb. 671, 1 N.W.2d 289
(1941).
30 Berg v. Griffiths, 127 Neb. 501 at 502, 256 N.W. 44 at 45 (1934).
31 Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 133 Neb. 818 at 824, 277 N.W. 331 at 334
(1938); City of South Omaha v. Sutliffe, 72 Neb. 746 at 754, 101 N.W.
997 at 1000 (1904).
32 Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
33 Remmenga v. Selk, supra.
34 Mischo v. Von Dohren, 126 Neb. 164 at 165, 252 N.W. 830 at 831 (1934).
35 Cotten v. Stolley, 124 Neb. 855 at 863, 248 N.W. 384 at 387 (1933).
36 Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684 at 689, 234 N.W. 628 at 630 (1931).
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dent. Thus the court in discussing the damages has mentioned
the fact that the plaintiff suffered insanity 37 as a result of the
accident, that plaintiff was suffering from dementia praecox, 38
a form of insanity, and that the plaintiff was progressing toward
traumatic insanity.39 In another case 40 however, a collision caused
plaintiff's decedent to go insane. Seventeen days later decedent
committed suicide. It was held in a wrongful death action that
there could be no recovery for the death since the suicide did
not come from an uncontrollable impulse.
In discussing the damages a person suffered, penumonia has
been considered where it is shown to have been caused by the
accident. Thus recovery has been allowed for pneumonia, with-
out expressly describing the type,41 where pneumonia set in after
the fourth day,42 and where an ambulance ran off a road and
a sick woman who had been riding in the ambulance was exposed
for an hour, and two days later died of pneumonia.43 In still
another case, recovery was allowed when an accident caused
pneumonia which in turn caused a heart condition. 44  On the
other hand, where decedent suffered a fractured collar bone in
an accident and eight months later died of bronchial pneumonia,
recovery was disallowed because no causal connection was shown
between the accident and the pneumonia.45
Recovery has been allowed for heart damage resulting from
an accident.46 On the other hand, recovery has been denied for
a coronary occlusion of the heart where the latter occurred al-
most ten months after the accident, recovery being denied be-
cause it was too speculative to consider.4 7 Recovery was denied
37 Omaha Street R. Co. v. Duvall, 40 Neb. 29 at 30, 58 N.W. 531 at 532
(1894); Simpson v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 107 Neb. 779 at 780,
186 N.W. 1001 at 1002 (1922).
3s Faulhaber v. Griswold, 124 Neb. 357 at 359, 246 N.W. 727 at 728 (1933).
39 Schwarting v. Ogram, 123 Neb. 76 at 87, 242 N.W. 273 at 277 (1932).
40 Long v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922).
41 Moran v. Moran, 124 Neb. 379 at 384, 246 N.W. 711 at 713 (1933); Dafoe
v. Grantski, 143 Neb. 344 at 353, 9 N.W.2d 488 at 494 (1943).
42 Dougerty v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 113 Neb. 356 at 357, 203 N.W.
538 at 539 (1925).
43 Mussman v. Steele, 126 Neb. 353, 253 N.W. 347 (1934).
44 Reals v. Grazis, 125 Neb. 877 at 879, 252 N.W. 413 at 414 (1934).
45 Williams v. Hines, 109 Neb. 11, 189 N.W. 623 (1922).
46 Reals v. Grazis, supra.
47 Harper v. Young, 139 Neb. 624 at 626, 298 N.W. 342 at 344 (1941).
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for appendicitis where it occurred eight weeks after the accident
and under the evidence there was merely a possibility that it
was caused by the accident.48 Recovery has been allowed where
a miscarriage resulted from an accident.4 9
D. REDUCTION OF LIFE EXPECTANCY
Although the plaintiff's recovery for future pain and suf-
fering is limited by his reduced life expectancy,;, the fact that
plaintiff's life expectancy has been reduced does not go unnoticed
and has been mentioned as an element of damages.51
III. PLEADING PERSONAL INJURIES
A plaintiff should be liberal in the amount he demands as
damages. Otherwise, the jury may award more than he asks
and the court will reduce the damages to the amount demanded.
Thus in one case plaintiff alleged automobile property damages,
loss of use and towing charges of $1210 and personal injuries of
$1000. 52 The jury awarded plaintiff in excess of $1977. On ap-
peal it was held that plaintiff had only proven property damage
and towing charge of $415, plus his own personal injuries. As
plaintiff only asked $1000 for personal injuries, his recovery for
injuries was limited to this latter amount, so the evidence sus-
tained the verdict only to the extent of $1415 and a remittiur
was ordered for the balance.
A problem may arise even though the jury does not award
an amount greater than the plaintiff demands. The jury 'may
award just what the plaintiff requests and the court may find
that this suggests that the jury was acting with passion and
prejudice.53 Still another danger arises where the plaintiff does
not ask for sufficient damages in his original prayer and dur-
48 Frickel v. Lancaster County, 115 Neb. 506 at 512, 213 N.W. 826 at 828
(1927).
49 Bresley v. O'Connor Inc., 163 Neb. 565 at 578, 80 N.W.2d 711 at 720
(1957); Bar v. Post, 56 Neb. 698, 77 N.W. 123 (1898). But see Schindler
v. Mulhair, 132 Neb. 809 at 816, 273 N.W. 217 at 219 (1937) where the
opinion suggests it may have been improper for the jury to consider
miscarriage.
50 Supra, footnote 10.
51 Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944).
52 Roby v. Auker, 151 Neb. 421 at 424, 37 N.W.2d 799 at 801 (1949).
53 Snyder v. Russell, 140 Neb. 616 at 623, 1 N.W.2d 125 at 128 (1942).
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ing the trial attempts are made to increase the damages requested.
Thus in a recent case, it was held to be reversible error where
the trial court, without request by plaintiff, increased in its in-
struction the amount for which the plaintiff sought recovery
from over $119,000 to over $144,000. 54
The Nebraska court appears to be liberal in allowing a plain-
tiff to show damages beyond those specifically pleaded. Thus
it has been held that damages for future pain and permanent
effect of injuries are recoverable under the general ad damnum
clause and need not be specifically alleged.50 Physical pain and
mental anguish need not be specifically alleged where the injury
imports them. 6 Plaintiff has been allowed to show the follow-
ing injuries at trial even though he did not specifically allege
them in his petition: Plaintiff alleged impairment of health and
mental condition, was permitted to show stuttering and loss of
control of bladder; 7 Plaintiff alleged injury to head, eye and nose,
was permitted to show brain injury; 8 and where the petition
alleged total disability the plaintiff was allowed to show a heart
condition.59
IV. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
A. WHERE THERE Is MoRETHAT ONE DEFENDANT
Where a plaintiff has been injured by the torts of more
than one defendant, he is given one judgment against all defend-
ants, and the jury cannot give a verdict in a certain amount
against one defendant and in a different amount against another.
Thus it has been held that the jury cannot assess $5000 against
one defendant and $2500 against the other defendant, but rather
should enter a verdict of $7500 against both defendants. 60
04 Kroeger v. Safranek, 161 Neb. 182 at 188, 72 N.W.2d 831 at 838 (1955).
50 Husak v. Omaha National Bank, 165 Neb. 537 at 545, 86 N.W.2d 604
at 609 (1957).
56 Fink v. Busch, 83 Neb. 599 at 604, 120 N.W. 167 at 169 (1909).
57 City of South Omaha v. Sutliffe, 72 Neb. 746 at 752, 101 N.W. 977 at
1000 (1904).
G8 Yost v. Nelson, 124 Neb. 33 at 36, 245 N.W. 9 at 11 (1932).
59 Reals v. Grazis, supra.
60 Forslund v. Swenson, 110 Neb. 188, 192 N.W. 649 (1923). Also see
Olson v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 87 Neb. 593 at 603, 127 N.W. 916 at
920 (1910).
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B. WHERE THERE Is ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE DEFENDANTS
In a few Nebraska cases, a plaintiff had been involved in
two or more accidents in close sequence. In such a situation,
there is a jury question as to what portion of the plaintiff's dam-
ages was caused by each tort feasor. Thus in a recent Nebraska
case, 61 a line of three cars collided, plaintiff being a passenger
in the center car. Plaintiff brought suit against the driver of
the rear of the three cars but the latter used as a defense that
before defendant struck the car in which plaintiff was riding,
the car in which the plaintiff was riding struck the rear of the
car preceding the plaintiff. The court held that the jury had
the duty of determining what damages the defendant had caused.
In another case,0 2 plaintiff while walking along a highway, was
struck by an unidentified car. While lying on the highway, he
was struck again, this time by defendant's car, so there was a
jury question as to what damages the defendant had caused.
In still another case,63 plaintiff claimed to have received a back
injury in a collision, but there was also evidence that he received
his injury after the accident while trying to lift the fender of
his car.
V. PROVING PAIN AND INJURIES
Pain and personal injuries can be proved in a number of ways.
Following is a discussion of some of the customary, and also of
some of the more unusual methods.
A. MEDICAL TESTIMONY
A doctor can testify to pain suffered by his injured patient.0 4
The doctor can testify to statements of a patient during the ex-
amination as to subjective symptoms. 65 Statements made to a
surgeon for the purpose of receiving treatment are competent
when necessary to an examination before treatment.66 In a classic
case,6 7 plaintiff's three doctors testified that the plaintiff suffered
61 Keiserman v. Lydon, 153 Neb. 279 at 282, 44 N.W.2d 513 at 516 (1950).
62 Weisenmiller v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153 at 159, 43 N.W.2d 568 at 572 (1950).
63 Simcho v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 150 Neb. 634 at 646, 35 N.W.2d
501 at 508 (1949).
64 Albrecht v. Morris, 91 Neb. 442 at 448, 136 N.W. 48 at 50 (1912).
65 Turpin v. State, 135 Neb. 389 at 393, 281 N.W. 800 at 802 (1938).
66 Willis v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 139 Neb. 46 at 51, 296 N.W.
443 at 446 (1941).
67 Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394 at 405, 13 N.W.2d 627
at 633 (1944).
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severe and painful injuries that were disabling, and would be
progressively so during his lifetime. The testimony of the de-
fendant's three doctors, on the other hand, indicated "that there
has been a complete recovery and there are and will be no after
effects." The jury could take its choice!
B. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITION OF WouNDs
Exhibition of wounds by the plaintiff is permitted in the trial
court's discretion."8 According to an older case,69 the exhibition
of wounds is permitted though "not to be encouraged."
In an early Nebraska case,70 a young woman, apparently at-
tractive, was injured in a fall from a street car and brought
suit against the street car company for her injuries. The de-
fendant argued that it was improper for plaintiff to show her
injured limb as plaintiff "a female, was young, handsome, and
attractive, and consequently that the sympathies of a jury com-
posed of men were unduly excited, in her behalf." The court re-
jected this argument, holding it was permissible for plaintiff to
display her injured limb, that she was entitled to present the
same proofs as "if she had been aged, ugly, and repulsive."
C. WITNESS' DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFFS' PAIN
A very effective way of showing a plaintiff's pain, and a
method apparently not used as much as in early Nebraska cases,
is for persons who have observed the plaintiff, whether they be
members of the family, friends or otherwise, to testify as to
plaintiff's expressions and actions showing pain.
Expressions of present existing pain and its locality are ex-
ceptions to the general rule which excludes hearsay evidence.7 1
Thus it has been held admissible for several non-expert witnesses
to testify as to plaintiff's suffering, pain and her nervous condi-
tion.72 Non-expert witnesses have also been permitted to testify
Wilson v. Thayer County Agricultural Society, 115 Neb. 579 at 584, 213
N.W. 966 at 968 (1927).
69 McKennan v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 97 Neb. 281 at 288, 149 N.W.
826 at 829 (1914).
70 Omaha Street R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240 at 244, 77 N.W. 675 at
676 (1898).
71 Turpin v. State, supra.
72 Thomas v. Haspel, 126 Neb. 255 at 260, 253 N.W. 73 at 75 (1934).
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to their opinion that plaintiff was sick, hurt and suffered pain.73
It has been held admissible for the parents of a plaintiff to testify
as to his sufferings, the length of time he was sick and that he
lay upon his bed moaning until he went out of his head.74 In
this same case, plaintiff's doctor was allowed to testify that plain-
tiff seemed dazed and that he complained of pain. It was ad-
missible for the plaintiff's mother to testify that plaintiff com-
plained of severe pain in her sides, head and back, and of sleep-
lessness and want of appetite.7 5
In a number of Nebraska cases, witnesses have described what
they observed as to plaintiff's pain, and the question as to ad-
missibility of this testimony was not raised on appeal. Thus in
one case,7 6 a wife testified that after her husband's accident, he
had to sleep in a chair, was unable to bear any weight on his
feet, had to be carried from one chair to another, and did not
get out of the house for some time and then only to the front
porch. In another case,7 7 witnesses testified that after the in-
jury, plaintiff sat in a rocking chair or lay on the couch, coughed
and spit blood, was unable to eat breakfast, and was weak and
had to support himself by holding onto things.
D. RES GESTAE STATEMENTS
Statements by an injured person spontaneously and involun-
tarily made at the time of an accident are admissible under the
res gestae rule, but not where they are made after the accident
and are merely narratives of past transactions.7 8 Vivid testi-
mony by witnesses as to what the injured person said immed-
iately after the accident occurred has been admitted in evidence.
Thus in an early case,7 9 witnesses sought to testify that immed-
iately after the accident plaintiff was unable to stand and had
73 McKennan v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 97 Neb. 281 at 285, 149
N.W. 826 at 828 (1914).
74 Dore v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 97 Neb. 250 at 255, 149 N.W. 792
at 794 (1914).
75 Omaha Street R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240 at 243, 77 N.W. 675 at
676 (1898).
76 Sharp v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 110 Neb. 34 at 39, 193 N.W. 150 at 152
(1923).
77 Lord v. Roberts, 102 Neb. 49 at 51, 165 N.W. 892 at 893 (1917).
78 Muff v. Grainard, 150 Neb. 650 at 652, 35 N.W.2d 597 at 599 (1949).
79 Nielsen v. County of Cedar, 5 Neb. Unof. 430 at 432, 98 N.W. 1090 at
1091 (1904).
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said that one of her limbs was broken and that she felt great
pain in her back, hip, side and limb. The court held that as
there was other testimony to this effect, the trial court's action
in excluding the above testimony was not reversible error. It
has also been held to be admissible evidence for the plaintiff to
testify that after being thrown from a street car she told the
conductor that she was hurt.80
On the other hand, statements made by an injured person
some time after an accident are inadmissible under the res gestae
rule since they are merely narratives of a past event. Thus testi-
mony that plaintiff's decedent had said "I sure hurt myself in the
guts as I went over the crossing there.", was inadmissible since
it was made 25 or 30 minutes after the accident.8 1
E. INJURIES TO PLAINTIFF'S FELLOW PASSENGER
Under the holding in a recent Nebraska case, a plaintiff may
now be able to successfully introduce in evidence the fact that
other persons involved in an accident received personal injuries.
In this case,8 2 plaintiff was injured while riding as a guest in
an automobile. Another passenger in the car testified that the
latter was thrown against and through the windshield of the
car and received serious injuries. The driver of the car testi-
fied that he was shaken up and bruised on his side and knees.
On appeal the court held the above testimony to be admissible
in the discretion of the court as tending to show the force of the
impact and the extent of the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff.
VI. PROOF OF MENTAL SUFFERING
As indicated in paragraph I (C) above, physical suffering
causes mental suffering and proof of the former suffices as to
evidence of the latter. However, where there are no physical
injuries, but the case is one where damages are permitted for
mental suffering even in the absence of physical injury, evidence
must be introduced to show the mental suffering. Thus in an
early Nebraska case,83 the plaintiff, a Negro, had been hired as
80 Nixon v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 79 Neb. 550 at 551, 113 N.W. 117
(1907).
81 Milton v. City of Gordon, 129 Neb. 888 at 891, 263 N.W. 208 at 210 (1935).
82 Jacobsen v. Poland, 163 Neb. 590 at 608, 80 N.W.2d 891 at 903 (1957).
83 Hoover v. Haynes, 65 Neb. 557 at 565, 91 N.W. 392 at 394 (1902). Also
see Kroeger v. Safranek, 161 Neb. 182 at 192, 72 N.W.2d 831 at 841
(1955).
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a messenger but was refused admission into defendant hotel which
he had tried to enter pursuant to his duties. He brought suit
against the hotel for alleged suffering and loss of income. The
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff but on appeal the
Nebraska Supreme Court ordered a new trial since there was
no evidence shown as to the mental pain and anguish suffered
by the plaintiff.
